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Abstract 
This paper explains variation in the labor supply of male and female employees 
by taking into account differences in conflict management strategies in Dutch 
households. While existing accounts on labor supply either emphasize house-
hold restrictions, firm influences or institutional constraints the approach taken 
here focuses on strategies of spouses to handle time-based interpersonal work-
household conflicts. Using a sample of 304 male and 238 female cohabiting 
employees drawn from 30 Dutch organizations, we analyze how gender moder-
ates the effect of conflict management strategies on labor supply, measured as 
the amount of actual working hours. Building on role congruity theory, we distin-
guish between two types of conflict management behavior. “Agentic” strategies 
are characterized by a low concern for other, and are usually ascribed to a male 
gender role. “Communal” strategies are characterized by a high concern for 
other and are usually ascribed to a female gender role. OLS and multilevel re-
gression analysis supports two hypotheses. First, working women relying on 
communal strategies to resolve time-allocation conflicts with their male partners 
will be more successful in achieving their objective to work more hours than 
women who don’t use communal strategies. Second, labor supply of working 
men increases with their use of agentic strategies. The findings support the 
proposition from role congruity theory that (in-)congruence between the (male) 
provider role and a female gender role explains gender differences in the impact 
of interpersonal conflict management behavior on labor supply. 
Zusammenfassung 
Der Artikel untersucht den Einfluss von Konfliktstrategien im Haushalt auf das 
Erwerbsarbeitszeitvolumen männlicher und weiblicher Beschäftigter. Während 
in der bisherigen Forschung Unterschiede im Arbeitsangebot durch Haushalts-
restriktionen, betriebliche Faktoren und institutionelle Merkmale erklärt werden, 
akzentuiert der vorliegende Beitrag unterschiedliche Strategien von Paaren zur 
Bewältigung interpersonaler Zeitallokationskonflikte. Anhand einer Stichprobe 
von 304 männlichen und 238 weiblichen Beschäftigten aus 30 niederländischen 
Betrieben wird untersucht, auf welche Weise geschlechtsspezifische Unter-
schiede den Einfluss der Konfliktstrategien auf das Erwerbsarbeitszeitvolumen 
moderieren. Ausgehend von der „role congruity theory“ werden zwei Typen von 
Konfliktstrategien unterschieden: „agentic strategies“ und „communal strate-
gies“. Die Ergebnisse der OLS-Regressionsanalyse und Mehrebenenanalyse 
bestätigen die folgenden Hypothesen: Der unterschiedliche Einfluss von Kon-
fliktstrategien auf das Erwerbsarbeitszeitvolumen von männlichen und weibli-
chen Beschäftigten lässt sich aus der (In-)Kongruenz von Versorgerrolle und 
geschlechtsspezifischen Rollenattributen erklären. Weibliche Beschäftigte kön-
nen ein größeres Erwerbsarbeitszeitvolumen realisieren, wenn sie zur Lösung 
von Zeitallokationskonflikten im Haushalt „communal strategies“ anwenden. 
Das Erwerbsarbeitszeitvolumen männlicher Beschäftigter steigt, wenn sie zur Lö-
sung von Zeitallokationskonflikten im Haushalt „agentic strategies“ anwenden. 
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1. Introduction 
Differences in the labor supply of men and women remain an important issue in 
sociological, economic and policy oriented research. In the Netherlands, like in 
most European countries, women spend considerably fewer hours on paid work 
and more hours on unpaid work than men (SCP, 2000; Plantenga, Schippers & 
Siegers, 1999: 109). Current explanations of these differences in labor supply 
come from economics, sociology, and organizational research. 
The standard economic labor supply model explains variations in working 
hours by differences in the comparative advantage each spouse may have on 
the labor market (Hallberg, 2001; Van Dijk & Siegers, 1996): the spouse with 
the higher earning potential will spend relatively more hours on paid work, while 
the other one takes over a higher share of unpaid work (see Grift, 1998; Van 
der Lippe & Siegers, 1994 for empirical evidence for the Netherlands). With the 
earning potential of men still being higher than that of women (Puchert, Gärtner 
& Höyng, 2005: 55), men will tend to work more hours than women.  
Sociological household research emphasizes the impact of ‘traditional’ vs. 
‘modern’ gender norms and role expectations on labor supply and the division 
of labor inside the household (Coltraine, 2000). Where traditional norms are 
salient, women were found to spend fewer hours on paid work and more hours 
on unpaid work than men (Bittman, England, Folbre et al., 2003; Van der Lippe 
and Siegers, 1994). Another important research line emphasizes the life-course 
perspective (Schmid & Gazier, 2002). This approach acknowledges the fact that 
household demands for paid and unpaid work vary over the life course and are 
strongly influenced by life-event and life-phase specific time and income prefer-
ences (Anxo, Boulin, Cebrián et al. 2005). Institutional opportunities and barri-
ers to adjust – to reduce or increase - working hours accordingly provides an 
important explanation of the gap between actual and preferred working hours 
(Fagan, 2001; Anxo & Erhel, 2005: 1). 
Organizational research stresses financial and non-financial incentives and 
constraints of the work environment as important factors affecting labor supply 
decisions of employees (Campbell, 2004: 6; Moen & Sweet, 2003: 22; Clark-
berg & Moen, 2001: 1119; Bell & Freeman, 2000; Hochschild, 1997). Recent 
studies have identified High Performance Human Resource Management 
(HPHRM) practices (e.g. performance related pay or team job designs) as an 
important determinant of labor supply. Hochschild (1997) stresses the impact of 
a high-commitment firm culture, Perlow (1998) focuses on the effect of manage-
rial control and a competitive firm culture, Barker (1993) demonstrated the 
strong impact of peer pressure as it originates from team job designs, and Moen 
& Sweet (2003) emphasize the role of high prestige jobs. In the Netherlands as 
elsewhere women are less likely to work long hours than men (Van der Broek & 
Breedveld, 2004). This difference is usually explained by the continuing trend 
for women to be more involved in unpaid family work (Van der Lippe & Siegers, 
1994). 
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In sum, the available evidence convincingly demonstrates that characteris-
tics of the household (in particular the wage rates, the presence of kids, age) 
and the employer (in particular the presence of high work demands) explain 
labor supply. 
More recent labor supply research suggests that previous studies are in-
complete because they have neglected negotiation processes in the household 
(Beblo, 2001; Kluwer, 1998; Perlow, 1999; Hochchild, 1997; Wotschack 2005). 
This holds also true for the life-course approach, which pays little attention to 
processes within the household to (re)negotiate and regulate time allocation 
patterns and working-time transitions of spouses. The degree to which spouses 
can successfully realize working-time transitions over the life course is usually 
explained by institutional influences but not by the household’s internal capabil-
ity to initiate and govern processes of change. 
The conclusion that negotiation processes in the household impact on the 
household’s labor supply is drawn by both economists and sociologists. First, 
departing from the assumption of a joint utility function in the standard economic 
model, economic bargaining models assume that households consist of indi-
viduals ‘with unique tastes and preferences who may or may not always agree – 
who may or may not have equal powers – who may or may not be equally well 
off’ (Phipps & Burton, 1995). Empirical studies show that an increase in the rela-
tive bargaining power of women in the household indeed increases women’s 
labor force participation (Beblo, 2001: 63; Chiappori, Fortin & Lacroix 1997). 
Second, recent sociological studies show that variations in the strategies to 
handle time-allocation conflicts within the household affect labor supply deci-
sions (Kluwer, 1998; Perlow, 1998). Perlow’s (1998) analysis suggests that 
some spouses (‘resistors’) will actively contend the additional time claims that a 
firm puts on their partner, whereas ‘acceptor’-spouses either do not object, or 
even encourage their partners to work more hours. In both cases, spouses ac-
tively influence the employee’s labor supply decision. Kluwer’s (1998: 127) 
study shows that such time-allocation conflicts usually follow a gender specific 
‘wife-demand and husband-withdrawal’ interaction pattern, resulting in men be-
ing more likely to comply with high workplace demands. 
According to these more recent contributions, strategies to resolve time al-
location conflicts in the household are a potentially important, yet so far ne-
glected, determinant of labor supply decisions of employees. However, none of 
these studies systematically tested to what degree variations in the strategies to 
manage intra-household time allocation conflicts can explain gender differences 
in labor supply. 
The present study addresses this gap by deriving and empirically testing 
hypotheses on the effect of cooperative vs. non-cooperative conflict manage-
ment strategies on the labor supply of male and female employees in the Neth-
erlands. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first effort to test a model of 
labor supply which assesses the joint impact of employer demand, household 
characteristics, and conflict management strategies of employees and their 
partners. 
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2. Theoretical Background 
Many scholars have noted that the rich literature on compliance-gaining, conflict 
management or influence strategies1 has to a large degree neglected to model 
the effectiveness of these strategies (Barry & Watson, 1996: 298; Brett et al., 
2005). The effectiveness of a conflict management strategy can be defined as 
the degree to which an interpersonal influence attempt brings about the desired 
result. In the case of intra-household time-allocation conflicts, an influence at-
tempt of a spouse is effective if e.g. she succeeds in convincing her husband to 
refrain from his intention to make long hours. 
Several theories have been proposed to explain gender differences in con-
flict-management effectiveness. Despite differences in their arguments, these 
gender role theories share the assumption that gender related biases play a 
crucial role as moderators of the relationship between conflict management 
strategy and effectiveness. 
Proponents of bias-centered theory (for a summary of this approach see 
Brett et al., 2005:493) argue that in organizational contexts, women’s compli-
ance gaining efforts will always be less effective than men’s, since a pro-mascu-
line gender role bias allocates higher status to men in Western societies. As a 
result, men will be taken more seriously than women and will be better listened 
to. Hence, even if women choose compliance strategies that are considered as 
appropriate for the situation by both men and women, they will be less effective 
than men using the same strategy. 
Asymmetric conflict theory (Kluwer, 1998; Vogel & Karney, 2002) suggests 
that conflicts about the division of work in the household typically occur because 
the wife is discontent with the husband’s contribution to unpaid work. She de-
mands change while the husband wants to maintain the status quo. This conflict 
constellation leads to an asymmetric conflict-handling pattern, the ‘wife-demand 
and husband-withdrawal’ interaction pattern (Kluwer, 1998: 127), which in turn 
is ineffective for women. Men benefit from this asymmetric structure: since they 
are in favor of the status quo they have a strategic advantage in negotiations 
over the division of unpaid work in the household and are more likely to reach 
their goal: ‘She wants to change the status quo and needs his active coopera-
tion to reach her objective, but he wants to maintain the status quo and will 
reach this goal by doing what he normally does’ (Kluwer, 1998: 35). 
The most elaborate attempt to theoretically model and empirically test the 
effect of gender differences on the effectiveness of compliance gaining strate-
gies is role congruity theory (Eagly, 1987; Eagly & Johannesen-Schmidt, 2001; 
Eagly & Karau, 2002; Eagly, Karau & Makhijani, 1995; Eagly, Makhijani & Klon-
sky, 1992; Ritter & Yoder, 2004). Role congruity theory builds on three key 
propositions. 
                                            
1  We will use these terms interchangeably. 
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First, it assumes that the majority of beliefs about the sexes pertain to 
‘communal’ and ‘agentic’ attributes: “Communal characteristics, which are as-
cribed more strongly to women, describe primarily a concern with the welfare of 
other people – for example, affectionate, helpful, kind, sympathetic, interper-
sonally sensitive, nurturing, and gentle. In contrast, agentic characteristics, 
which are ascribed more strongly to men, describe primarily an assertive, con-
trolling, and confident tendency – for example, aggressive, ambitious, dominant, 
forceful, independent, self-sufficient, self-confident, and prone to act as a 
leader”. (Eagly & Karau, 2002: 574). 
Second, it argues that in order to be effective in their compliance gaining at-
tempts, the behavior of men and women needs to be consistent with their gen-
der roles. Thus, women using communal strategies are likely to be more suc-
cessful in gaining compliance than women using agentic strategies, and the use 
of agentic strategies will be more disadvantageous for women than for men. A 
key difference between role congruity theory and other gender role theories is 
that it makes no assumptions about gender differences in the use of specific 
kinds of compliance gaining behaviors, but only that behaviors that are ac-
cepted for a man may not be accepted for a woman. 
Third, for women in leadership positions, their gender role is likely to conflict 
with their managerial role: to the degree that the managerial role women have 
to fill is agentic, the more likely they will elicit negative reactions and non-
compliance from others because she deviates from her expected gender role. 
Consequently, “women in managerial positions can avoid negative reactions 
associated with taking a masculine-oriented role by combining the assertive, 
confident, and decisive behaviors required in this role with a more communal or 
feminine style” (Eagly & Karau, 2002). 
Role congruity theory has been applied successfully to explain gender re-
lated variations in the effectiveness of compliance gaining in organizational and 
experimental settings. Carli (1999) found that women have greater difficulty ex-
erting influence than men do, particularly when the influence tactic they use 
conveys competence and authority – traits that are usually attributed to male 
interpersonal behavior. Consequently, women are less influential when the in-
fluence or communication strategy they use is perceived as dominant (Carli, 
2001). An experimental study by Shackelford, Wood & Worchel (1996) showed 
that women with a people-oriented style and competence exerted greater influ-
ence over men than did women who were merely competent. Atwater, Carey & 
Waldman (2001) found that female managers engaging in ‘masculine oriented 
roles’ (e.g. delivering reprimands) were seen as less effective than male man-
agers by their employees. Brett et al. (2005) showed that women are more ef-
fective than men if they use a ‘communal’ style of compliance gaining. 
The presented evidence supports the assumption that the use of ‘agentic’ 
strategies is seen as a traditionally masculine role (Brett et al., 2005; Ritter & 
Yoder, 2004). So far, the application of role congruity theory has been limited to 
organizational and experimental settings. Role incongruity was defined as a 
mismatch between a (communal) female gender role and an (agentic) manage-
rial or leadership role. We suggest that role congruity theory can be extended to 
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the context of intra-household time-allocation conflicts. More specifically, we 
argue that working women experience incongruity between their gender role 
and their role as (main, secondary, or co-)provider (Hood, 1986) in the house-
hold. The traditional provider role has predominantly agentic connotations: “The 
traditional good provider role took on negative connotations such as distant, 
strict, harsh, authoritarian, bumbling, and incompetent ... putting priority of job 
over family... Breadwinning was active, responsible, emotionally invested, de-
manding, expressive, and measured real devotion” (Christiansen & Palkovitz, 
2001). Based on discourse analysis of interviews with 45 white professional 
men, Riley (2003) concludes that despite social change in gender relations and 
the rise of egalitarian value systems, a legitimate successor to the male pro-
vider role has not yet emerged: “The provider role functioned to define success 
and status; ‘real’ work; and the legitimate mechanism for the production of male 
identity”. Furthermore, there is strong empirical evidence that women taking a 
provider role violate gender role expectations (Deutsch & Saxon, 1998; Helms-
Erikson et al., 2000; Tichenor, 2005; Willot and Griffin, 2004). Though empirical 
evidence also shows a trend towards more egalitarian gender ideologies re-
garding family roles both in Europe (Ciabattari, 2001) and the U.S. (Zuo & Tang, 
2000), this trend is slower and less pronounced for men, and exhibits consider-
able cross-national variation (Pfau-Effinger, 2004). In particular higher status 
men tend to disapprove of women sharing a provider role (Zuo & Tang, 2000). 
From the perspective of role congruity theory, the highly agentic connota-
tion of the provider role implies that working women will be likely to experience 
role incongruity between their (communal) female gender role and their (agen-
tic) provider role. It follows that this role incongruity will affect the effectiveness 
of their compliance gaining strategies during intra-household time allocation 
conflicts. Working women using agentic compliance gaining strategies (e.g. 
forcing) enact the traditional agentic provider model, and will therefore be likely 
to elicit negative reactions and non-compliance from their male partners, be-
cause by doing so they deviate from their communal gender role. Conversely, 
working women who instead use communal compliance gaining strategies (e.g. 
problem solving, accommodating) to resolve time allocation conflicts with their 
partner will be more successful in resolving the conflict to their advantage. 
Hence, we formulate our first two theoretical hypotheses: 
TH1: The stronger the reliance on agentic compliance gaining strategies to 
resolve time-allocation conflicts, the less effective working women will be 
in achieving their objective. 
TH2: The stronger the reliance on communal compliance gaining strate-
gies to resolve time-allocation conflicts, the more effective working women 
will be in achieving their objective. 
For men, the opposite holds, since expectations concerning the (agentic) pro-
vider role and the (agentic) male gender roles are congruent. This legitimates 
their use of agentic compliance gaining strategies, whereas the use of commu-
nal compliance gaining strategies will be perceived as incongruent with the role 
expectations. This leads to our second set of theoretical hypotheses: 
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TH3: The stronger the reliance on agentic compliance gaining strategies to 
resolve time-allocation conflicts, the more effective working men will be in 
achieving their objective. 
TH4: The stronger the reliance on communal compliance gaining strate-
gies to resolve time-allocation conflicts, the less effective working women 
will be in achieving their objective. 
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3. Empirically Testable Hypotheses 
Research on compliance gaining strategies is characterized by a very large 
amount of typologies and measures, and a recurring criticism in this field con-
cerns the often rather weak link between the compliance gaining classification 
and the theoretical objectives of the study (Kellerman & Cole, 1994). In the pre-
sent study, ‘agentic’ vs. ‘communal’ orientations represent the key theoretical 
constructs underlying interpersonal compliance gaining behavior during intra-
household time-allocation conflicts. Communal behaviors have been defined as 
describing primarily a concern with the welfare of other people („affectionate, 
helpful, kind, sympathetic, interpersonally sensitive, nurturing, and gentle“), 
whereas agentic behaviors are described by behavior showing a low concern 
with the welfare of other people (“assertive, controlling, aggressive, dominant, 
forceful, independent”). A measurement instrument for compliance gaining 
strategies which captures exactly these two dimensions has been developed in 
the context of dual concern theory (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993; Jansen & Van de 
Vliert, 1996). Dual concern theory classifies compliance gaining strategies ac-
cording to the degree to which they represent a high or low concern for self and 
a high or low concern for others. The resulting constructs have been validated 
and tested in numerous studies (Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993). Strategies repre-
senting a high concern for other are labeled problem solving and accommodat-
ing. We consider both strategies to represent the theoretical construct of ‘com-
munal’ strategies.2 Strategies linked to a low concern for the other are avoiding 
and forcing. We consider these two strategies as mapping the theoretical con-
struct of ‘agentic’ strategies. 
The effectiveness of a compliance gaining strategy can be related to a large 
variety of different objectives which the person using it might want to achieve. In 
the context of our study, the intra-household conflict is related to a boundary 
control issue. It concerns the amount of time that the employed conflict party 
allocates to his or her work (‘labor supply’ as reflected in the number of actual 
working hours), and the attempts of the spouse to negotiate this amount. Fol-
lowing Perlow (1998), we distinguish between conflict management behavior of 
a focal employee and conflict management behavior of his or her part-
ner/spouse. From the perspective of the partner/spouse, the purpose of his or 
her compliance gaining effort is to influence the labor supply of the employed 
partner (e.g. the ‘resistor spouses’ in Perlow’s study). From the perspective of 
the focal employee, the purpose of his or her compliance gaining effort is to le-
gitimize and defend his or her own time allocation decision. 
                                            
2  Compromising was excluded from the analysis because it is highly correlated with problem 
solving. Yet, additional analyses which included compromising did neither show a significant 
effect of compromising nor did it change the significant effects of the other strategies. 
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Building on this specification of the theoretical constructs and informed by 
role congruity theory, we can now formulate the following empirical hypotheses 
on the effect of compliance gaining strategies on labor supply. 
EH1: The stronger an employed woman relies on (a) forcing, or (b) avoid-
ance to resolve time-allocation conflicts with her male partner, the lower 
the amount of hours she will spend at work. 
EH2: The stronger an employed woman relies on (a) problem solving or 
(b) accommodation to resolve time-allocation conflicts with her male part-
ner, the higher the amount of hours she will spend at work. 
EH3: The stronger an employed man relies on (a) forcing or (b) avoidance 
to resolve time-allocation conflicts with his female partner, the higher the 
amount of hours he will spend at work. 
EH4: The stronger an employed man relies on (a) problem solving or (b) 
accommodation to resolve time-allocation conflicts with his female partner, 
the lower the amount of hours he will spend at work. 
Table 1: Overview on the expected effects on employees’ labor supply 
 Male employees Female employees 
Household and firm characteristics   
High earning potential employee + + 
High earning potential partner – – 
Children – – 
Age – – 
High employer demand + + 
Conflict management strategies   
Agentic strategies employee + – 
Communal strategies employee – + 
Agentic strategies partner + – 
 
As noted above, role congruity theory predicts that agentic behavior of women 
is particularly likely to elicit resistance if the woman who applies them has to fill 
at least two incongruent roles. Role congruity theory is less clear with regard to 
what happens if non-working men and women use agentic compliance gaining 
strategies. Since the occurrence of a negative reaction would not be at odds 
with role congruity theory, we draw on bias centered theory to specify the fol-
lowing empirical hypotheses with regard to the effects of compliance gaining 
behavior of the partner: 
EH1*: The stronger the female partner of an employed man relies on (a) 
forcing or (b) avoidance to resolve time-allocation conflicts with her male 
partner, the higher the amount of hours he will spend at work. 
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EH2*: The stronger the female partner of an employed man relies on (a) 
problem solving or (b) accommodating to resolve time-allocation conflicts 
with her male partner, the lower the amount of hours he will spend at work. 
EH3*: The stronger the male partner of an employed woman relies on (a) 
forcing or (b) avoidance to resolve time-allocation conflicts with his female 
partner, the lower the amount of hours she will spend at work. 
EH4*: The stronger the male partner of an employed woman relies on (a) 
problem solving or (b) accommodating to resolve time-allocation conflicts 
with his female partner, the higher the amount of hours she will spend at 
work. 
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4. Research Design and Data 
The Time Competition Survey 2003 is used for testing the hypotheses. This 
survey used a multi-stage, multi-level research design of 1114 employees and 
their partners (if applicable) from 30 Dutch work organizations. Since the firm 
survey oversamples modern (knowledge based) work organizations the sample 
is not representative for the Dutch population. In each firm, two to four charac-
teristic occupational groups with homogenous work conditions were selected; in 
total 89 different occupational groups. Management (human resource manage-
ment and department managers) completed a written questionnaire on firm and 
work characteristics (e.g. occupational structure, market demands, work organi-
zation, incentive structure, working time regulations). This resulted in an organi-
zation-level dataset based on the responses of 30 human resource managers 
and 89 department managers. In a second step, we drew a random sample of 
four to ten employees from each occupational group. The selected employees 
and their partners (if applicable) were interviewed by both (computer aided) 
face-to-face interviews and written questionnaires (including a pre-coded time-
use diary for one week). All data were collected in 2002/3.3 Employees and 
partners were interviewed separately at home. The interviews were carried out 
by professional interviewers and took between one and two hours. The follow-
ing analysis is based on a subsample of 542 cohabiting employees (304 male 
and 238 female cohabiting employees) from 79 different occupational groups in 
30 companies. 
The 304 male employees are between 25 and 60 years old (average is 40 
years, for partners 39 years). They are relatively highly educated (on average 
15.,8 years of formal education, partners 15,3 years) and earn on average (net 
wage-rate) about 17,6 Euros per hour (partners 14,6 Euros per hour). 18% of 
the male employees live in breadwinner households, 65% in one-and-a-half 
earner households, 17% in dual earner households. 33% of the male employ-
ees do not have resident children. In 28% of the households children are 
younger than 4 years, 40% of the households have children between 4 and 12 
years, 24% have children of 12 years and older. On a scale of five different 
items for high firm demands – firm in the private sector, high performance work 
culture, understaffing, supervisory position, working with targets and deadlines 
– our male employees score on average on 2,27 items indicating a moderate 
average employer demand for this group. 
The 238 female employees are between 23 and 59 years old (average is 39 
years, for partners 40 years). They are relatively highly educated (on average 
15,7 years of formal education, partners 15,7 years) and earn on average (net 
wage-rate) about 14,8 Euros per hour (partners 15,6 Euros per hour).  
                                            
3  Data collection was part of a larger integrated research project ‘Time Competition’ (Principal 
Investigators Tanja van der Lippe, Utrecht University, and Arie Glebbeek, University of 
Groningen) funded by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO). 
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67% of the female employees live in one-and-a-half earner households, 27% in 
dual earner households, 5% are breadwinners. 36% of the female employees 
do not have resident children. In 21% of the households children are younger 
than 4 years, 36% of the households have children between 4 and 12 years, 
24% have children of 12 years and older. On a scale of five different items for 
high firm demands – firm in the private sector, high performance work culture, 
understaffing, supervisory position, working with targets and deadlines – our 
female employees score on average on 1,5 items. 
Dependent Variable 
The number of actual weekly working hours is the dependent variable. It was 
measured using the following question: ‘How many hours are you factually 
working on average per week? Please take into account overtime, but not your 
traveling time’. Furthermore, the variable contains the hours that are worked in 
a second job (if any). If the employee receives yearly time compensation for 
overtime on a regular base (so called ‘adv hours’) these hours were subtracted 
from the total amount of weekly working hours. 
The 304 male employees in our sample work on average about 41 hours 
per week. About 10% of the male employees work less than 36 hours per week, 
a majority of 40% works 36 to 40 hours per week, 24% work 41 to 45 hours per 
week, 20% more than 45 hours per week. The 238 female employees work on 
average about 31 hours per week. Typically for employed women, the working 
hours show more variation: about 15% work 20 hours per week or less, 27% 
work 21 to 30 hours per week, 23% work 31 to 35 hours per week, 25% work 36 
to 40 hours per week, 10% work more than 40 hours per week. 
Independent Variables 
In order to investigate how spouses handle situations of time-based work-
household conflict we used a conflict scenario. The scenario represents a rather 
moderate conflict situation in which the reactions of the partners are less sensi-
tive to socially desirable answers (as it would be the case when it was about 
‘time for children’) and where the partners cannot easily escape the conflict by 
third party strategies (outsourcing of tasks). The employee and the spouse in-
dependently from each other indicated their reactions on the following situa-
tion:4 
“You have a dinner appointment with your partner for the next week. But 
suddenly it turns out that you have to work overtime on that evening. Your 
                                            
4 This particular conflict situation (‘time for work’ versus ‘time for each other’) is not represen-
tative for all the various conflicts that use to occur in households. A more exhaustive meas-
urement of conflict handling would have to work with a number of scenarios that would take 
into account additional conflict issues like ‘time for children’ or ‘time for household tasks’. 
- 13 - 
partner is very interested to have this dinner together with you, but you 
would prefer to work. What would you do in such a situation?”  
The conflict issue differed for the employee and the spouse: for the employee it 
was working overtime (though the partner wants to have dinner together), for 
the partner it was having dinner together (though the employee wants to work 
overtime). The scenario was followed by 20-items taken from Janssen’s and 
Van de Vliert’s (1996) operationalization of five different conflict handling strate-
gies. For each item, the respondents indicated on five-point Likert-type answer 
categories to what extent they would use the conflict handling strategy de-
scribed by the item. The twenty items represent five different conflict-handling 
subscales of 4 items each: (1) Accommodating: Making concessions to the wish 
of the partner (e.g. ‘I conform to the goals of my partner’). (2) Problem solving: 
Trying to find a solution that matches both spouses’ wishes (e.g. ‘We negotiate 
thoroughly until we achieve a solution, which is satisfying for both of us’). (3) 
Compromising: Making concessions when the partner is doing so, too (e.g. ‘I 
stand up for that we both have to make concessions’. (4) Avoiding: Doing noth-
ing (or as little as possible) to resolve the conflict (e.g. ‘I avoid a confrontation 
with my partner’). (5) Forcing: Trying to persuade the partner to make conces-
sions (e.g. ‘I do everything to win the conflict’). In the regression models (see 
tables 6.4 and 6.5) each conflict-handling strategy enters as a dummy variable, 
indicating that the respondent uses the strategy (value higher than 12 on a 
scale from 4 to 20). Because of high collinearity compromising was excluded 
from the analysis. 
Control Variables 
We include several household and firm related variables which have been iden-
tified as important determinants of labor supply in previous research. According 
to economic accounts on labor supply (see Beblo, 2001; Hallberg, 2001) em-
ployees will work more hours when they have a comparative advantage (higher 
productivity) in paid work while their partner has a comparative advantage 
(higher productivity) in unpaid work. Differences in the earning potential (wage 
rates) of spouses make it efficient for the household to apply a specialized divi-
sion of paid and unpaid work. The higher the earning potential of an employee 
and the lower the earning potential of the spouse, the more the household can 
maximize household income (and free time) by a specialized division of work. A 
high earning potential of male employees and a low earning potential of their 
wives will thus support long working hours. In contrast, a high earning potential 
of female employees and a low earning potential of their husbands will support 
long working hours of female employees. We therefore include the wage rate of 
the employee and the wage rate of the spouse as control variables. Calculation 
of the employee’s and the partner’s net wage rates is based on several income 
measures (considering additional income sources) and average actual weekly 
working hours, including overtime and its compensation. For individuals with 
missing relevant variables, including partners who do not work for pay, a wage 
rate had to be imputed on the basis of a wage equation for individuals with all 
relevant variables available. For consistency reasons, an imputed wage rate  
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has been used for all individuals. The wage equations have been estimated 
separately for male respondents, female respondents, male partners and fe-
male partners. 
Children in the household increase the need for time (particularly when they 
are young) and money (higher expenses). Spouses with (young) children can 
maximize household income and free time by a specialized division of paid work 
and childcare. Women usually face more normative expectations to engage in 
childcare. As a consequence, the presence of (young) children will establish 
incentives for women to spend more time on care and less time on paid work 
(Van der Lippe & Siegers, 1994). Children in the household will thus restrict 
long working hours of female employees. For male employee we cannot predict 
a clear effect. On the one hand (young) children increase financial demands in 
the household. This might be an incentive for the husband to work more hours, 
particularly when he has a comparative advantage (higher productivity) in the 
labor market. On the other hand (young) children require time for care and es-
tablish an incentive to work fewer hours in order to spend more time on family 
activities. To control for the effect of the presence of children of different age, 
we used dummy variables for the presence of (a) young children in the house-
hold (younger than 4 years) and (b) older children (between 4 years and 13 
years), and (c) old children (13 years or older). 
Organizational research has pointed out that high employer demands and 
work incentives make it more rewarding for employees to work long hours (Van 
Echtelt & Smulders, 2003; Campbell, 2004). When employers claim a high work 
engagement, employees can achieve social approval and better career chances 
by conforming to these demands (respectively reduce disapproval and the risk 
to be dismissed). One way to conform to high work demands and to show a 
high work commitment is to work long hours. High employer demands will thus 
have a positive effect on labor supply. The cumulative amount of employer de-
mands was measured using five items: (1) whether the firm is a for-profit or a 
non-profit organization (as answered by the management); (2) whether the 
function group is characterized by a high-performance culture (as answered by 
the management); (3) whether the function group is frequently confronted with 
targets and deadlines (as answered by the management); (4) understaffing for 
the employee’s function group (as answered by the management); (5) whether 
the employee has a supervisory position (as answered by the employee). The 
items were first dichotomized and then summed. The minimum value is zero 
(hardly any employer demands), the maximum value five (strong employer de-
mands). We controlled for the employees’ age (measured in years). 
- 16 - 
5. Results 
To test the hypotheses, separate OLS regression estimations are carried out for 
male and female employees. The results are summarized in Table 6.4 for 
women and Table 6.5 for men. In order to control for possible selection effects 
on the firm level (n=30) and department level (n=79), we also run a multilevel 
analysis (Snijders & Bosker 1999). The multilevel regression estimations con-
firmed the effects of the OLS regression analysis. Consequently, we can refer to 
the OLS regression models in the following. (Slight) differences between the 
multilevel and OLS regression model are reported in footnotes. 
Table 6.4 reveals that the use of problem solving significantly increases the 
labor supply of working women. These findings support hypotheses EH2a but 
not EH2b; we do not find a significant effect of accommodating. Since none of 
the other conflict handling strategies has a significant effect, no support could 
be found for the hypotheses that working women using forcing (EH1a) or avoid-
ing (EH1b) would work less hours. 
Table 6.4 shows further that none of the spouse’s conflict-handling strate-
gies significantly affects female labor supply. Therefore, no support is found for 
the hypotheses that the use of forcing (EH3a*) or avoiding (EH3b*) by male 
spouses will result in an decrease in working hours of employed women, and no 
support is found for the hypotheses that the use of problem solving (EH4a*) or 
accommodating (EH4b*) by their male spouses will increase the labor supply of 
employed women. 
As far as the control variables are concerned, table 6.4 shows that the 
wage rate, the absence of young children (up to 12 years), a low age and high 
employer demands significantly increase the labor supply of women. The hus-
band’s earning capacity does not have a significant effect. 
Taken together, the results for women provide partial support for the theo-
retical hypothesis that employed women using communal strategies to resolve 
time-allocation conflicts will be more effective in achieving their objective to 
work more hours. However, the use of agentic strategies by working women 
does not work counterproductive. Forcing or avoiding do neither increase nor 
decrease a working woman’s labor supply. 
Table 6.5 shows that employed men who strongly rely on the use of forcing 
to resolve intrahousehold time allocation conflicts work significantly more hours 
than men who don’t use forcing.5 This finding supports EH3a. Since none of the 
other conflict handling strategies used by the employee significantly affects 
male labor supply, no support is found for the following hypotheses: neither 
does the use of avoiding increase the working hours of men (EH3b), nor does  
 
                                            
5 The multilevel regression analysis confirmed the effect of forcing but only at a 10%-signifi-
cance level. 
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the use of problem solving (EH4a) or accommodating (EH4b) lead to a reduc-
tion in working hours. Yet, table 6.5 shows further that the use of accommodat-
ing by the female spouse significantly increases the labor supply of male em-
ployees. Thus, we have to reject our hypothesis that the use of accommodating 
strategies by female spouses would reduce the labor supply of male employees 
(EH2b*). No support is found for the hypotheses that the use of forcing (EH1a*) 
or avoiding (EH1b*) strategies by female spouses will result in an increase in 
working hours of male employees, and no support is found for the hypotheses 
that the use of problem solving strategies (EH2a*) will decrease the labor sup-
ply of their employed men. 
With regard to the control variables, table 6.5 shows that the wage-rate and 
high employer demands significantly increase the working hours of males, 
whereas age has a significant negative effect. The presence of young children 
(up to 12 years) does not have a significant impact on male labor supply,6 while 
the presence of children of 13 years or older increases the labor supply. 
In sum, the results for men provide partial support for the theoretical hy-
pothesis that the use of agentic strategies to resolve time-allocation conflicts is 
an effective instrument for working men. The use of communal strategies does 
neither increase nor decrease a working woman’s labor supply. 
                                            
6 The multilevel regression analysis showed a significant (5%-level) negative effect of the 
presence of children younger than four years on male labor supply. 
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6. Discussion and Conclusion 
This research started from the observation that previous research on labor sup-
ply of men and women focused on the effects of household and firm character-
istics but neglected the impact of intra-household conflict management strate-
gies. This holds also true for the life-course approach, a key component of the 
concept of transitional labor markets. This perspective considers individuals’ 
and households’ changing needs and preferences over the life course as well 
as the institutional opportunities and barriers – particularly in a gender context - 
to meet these needs by appropriate working-time transitions (see Anxo & Erhel, 
2005). Yet, is does not take into account the household’s ability to really initiate 
working-time transitions and to realize a change of the established time ar-
rangement in the household – even when external restrictions were favorable. It 
was one goal of this article to contribute to this research line by putting the fo-
cus on governance practices in the household. We wanted to know in which 
way and to what extent strategies to handle interpersonal time-based conflicts 
influence the labor supply of male and female employees. Basically, we can 
draw three main conclusions: 
Firstly, with regard to household and firm characteristics, our findings are in 
line with earlier research, according to which wage rates, the presence of chil-
dren, age, and strong employer demand account for most of the variation in la-
bor supply. The findings also underline the importance of life-course specific 
phases and events for the labor supply of employees, like for instance a higher 
labor supply in the career phase when employees are young and do not yet 
have children. Moreover, these patterns show clear gender differences in terms 
of a male breadwinner and female care-provider role: it’s still women who re-
duce their working hours considerably when children are young (up to 12 
years), while men do not significantly adapt their working hours, respectively 
rather increase their labor supply when children are somewhat older (13 years 
or older), probably due to increasing monetary costs of older children. 
Secondly, the findings with regard to conflict handling are in line with the 
predictions of gender role theory (Egaly, 1987; Eagly & Karau, 2002) and the so 
called status-quo effect (Kluwer, 1998). Due to the legitimizing power of the 
dominant time arrangement pattern, the given unequal division of paid work has 
a tendency to persist. Due to the asymmetric structure of the given division of 
work in the household, female employees who want to work more hours have to 
challenge the status quo. Female employees are more likely to succeed in this 
when they use cooperative conflict strategies, which integrate the husband into 
the process of change and trigger his cooperativeness. Male employees, in con-
trast, can successfully realize more working hours by uncooperative conflict 
strategies. At the same time, these results show clearly that there is a ‘bonus’ 
for role congruence: men using agentic conflict handling strategies are more 
likely to achieve the goal of working more, and so do women using communal 
strategies. The analysis shows further that here seems to be no punishment for 
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role incongruence: the use of agentic conflict handling strategies by working 
women does not evoke counterproductive reactions of their spouses, but also 
does not help to achieve their goal. Likewise, the use of communal conflict han-
dling strategies by working men does not decrease their working time, but is 
also not effective in increasing it. 
A third noteworthy aspect of the findings is that the conflict strategy of male 
spouses does not significantly affect the labor supply of female employees, 
while conflict handling of female spouses does affect the labor supply of male 
employees: The more a female spouse handles work-household conflicts by 
accommodating strategies, the more hours her husband work. Among the dif-
ferent communal conflict strategies, accommodating seems to be a strategy, 
which does not help female spouses to restrict the labor supply of their em-
ployed husbands – probably because this strategy negates own interests. This 
finding does not only point at an important difference in the functioning of differ-
ent communal strategies. It also sheds an interesting light on Perlow’s (1998) 
analysis, according to which spouses with a resister strategy will effectively in-
stigate their employed partners to work less hours, with the amount of reduced 
working hours depending on the attitude (acceptor vs. resister) of the employee. 
According to our analyses, this holds partly true for male employees (respec-
tively their female spouses) but not for female employees. At least in the Dutch 
couples participating in this study, it does not seem to matter much whether or 
not and how spouses react to the attempts of female employees to increase the 
hours spent at work. What seems to count – for male as well as female employ-
ees- is how the employee deals with the intra-household conflict on the inter-
personal level. Strategies that are congruent with the gender role of the em-
ployed person using them are clearly more likely to be successful than strate-
gies that are incongruent with gender expectations. 
We want to conclude this study by pointing towards some limitations of our 
study and sketch some promising leads for future research. 
The first limitation is that the model did not consider differences in concrete 
time demands and time preferences of households. Not all employees in our 
sample really have an interest to work long hours. Due to career, family or lei-
sure demands - strongly related to the current phase in the life cycle and the 
household’s earner model – employees will be more or less willing to increase 
(respectively reduce) their working hours. In this respect the model would bene-
fit from a typology that distinguishes distinct life stages with characteristic time 
demands - as it is provided by the life-course approach. This would at the same 
time offer an opportunity to investigate whether and what sort of conflict-
handling patterns in the household support employees to satisfy these time de-
mands by appropriate working-time transitions. Moreover, our model did not 
consider the factual extent and character of interpersonal time conflicts in the 
household. It is quite evident that differences in conflict handling will have a 
higher impact on time allocation patterns when there is a mismatch in the 
spouses’ time preferences. When time based conflicts are rather absent differ-
ent ways of conflict handling will be of minor importance for processes of 
household governance. 
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Secondly, the model we presented here neglects the available opportunity 
structure of the household to solve (respectively ‘outsource’) time-based inter-
personal conflicts. This holds particularly true for private or public institutions, 
providing domestic services and childcare facilities. The availability, accessibility 
and character of such services (see Ruijter, Van der Lippe & Raub, 2004) will 
influence the household’s opportunities to prevent interpersonal work-household 
conflicts by ‘buying’ time. Other examples for the importance of institutional fac-
tors are legal regulations on working hours, collective agreements or (‘family 
friendly’) firm policies. We would expect that variations in these institutional fac-
tors determine the degree to which spouses are factually forced (respectively 
relieved) to deal with conflicts around the gendered division of work. Moreover, 
it is likely that the given institutional opportunity structure will also influence the 
choice of cooperative versus uncooperative conflict-handling strategies. It would 
be a promising next step in our research program to extend the model by taking 
into account these factors, for instance by considering available financial re-
sources (opportunity to buy time), a high degree of influence on the amount and 
structure of working hours (opportunity to influence work schedules) or the 
availability and access to institutions, which provide domestic services and 
childcare facilities (opportunity to outsource work-household conflicts). 
Our findings also point to some fruitful areas for further research. First, fu-
ture studies would benefit from a more detailed analysis of the interaction of 
conflict strategies as they are used by employees and their partners, as Perlow 
(1998) has done in her qualitative study, and as Kluwer (1998) suggests in her 
wife-demand-husband-withdrawal hypothesis. Second, future analyses would 
benefit from paying closer attention to the impact of household rules regulating 
time allocation patterns. Previous analyses carried out on this dataset have 
shown that routines have a crucial impact on time allocation. The existence of 
such ex ante governance structures may result in ex post conflict handling 
strategies becoming less important. Finally, future research would need to pay 
more attention to variations in female provider role perceptions (Hood, 1986). 
Since provider role perceptions seem to change for both sexes, they might be 
among the more important future candidates explaining labor supply differences 
between the sexes. 
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